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RECENT CASE NOTES
CHANGE] OF VENUE FROM JUDGE IN

CRIMINAL

CASE-CONSTITUTIONAL

LAw.-The defendants were charged by affidavit with the crime of robbery.
On December 23, 1930, the cause was set to be tried on January 2, 1931.
On December 31, 1930, the defendants filed a motion and affidavit for a
change of venue because of bias and prejudice of the judge. This motion
was overruled by the court and the defendants appeal, alleging that there
was error in so ruling. Affirmed.l
An Indiana statute2 provides that the defendant in a criminal prosecution may have a change of venue from the judge on account of bias and
prejudice, but that an affidavit must be filed at least ten days before the.
date for which the trial is set, or if it is set for a day less than ten days
away, it must be filed within two days. It will be noted that the defendants' trial was set for a full ten days ahead, but that their affidavit was
not filed until two days before the day named. The defendants alleged,
however, that they had just discovered the bias and prejudice of the judge.
The court, in upholding the action of the judge in refusing the affidavit
and motion, held that "in the absence of a statute giving a defendant in
a criminal action the right to a change of venue from the judge on account of bias and prejudice, no right to such a change exists. * * *
Appellants' right, or rather privilege, to a change from the judge on
account of bias and prejudice being statutory, the legislature may withhold it entirely or grant it on such conditions as may seem just and
proper." The court then pointed out that the appellants had not complied with the statute and therefore had no grounds for complaint.
Assuming, for a moment, that a defendant does not have a privilege to
a change of venue in the absence of a statute, was the court correct in
holding that if the legislature chose to grant such a privilege, it could do
so upon whatever conditions it saw fit to impose? While there are cases
the other way,3 there is a considerable amount of authority to the effect
that the mere power to withhold a privilege is not the power to grant it
upon any condition, but that the condition must be constitutional.4 By
this the courts seem to mean that the condition must not be the surrender
of a legal privilege guaranteed by the Constitution. Thus, it has been held
that the power to exclude foreign" corporations is not the power to admit
them upon the condition that they give up the privilege of suing in the
federal courts;5 and that the power to prohibit the use of the public
highways is not the power to allow private carriers to use them upon the
condition that they become common carriers.0 While this doctrine-that the
1

Detrich v, The State, Supreme Court of Indiana, Oct. 26, 1932, 182 N. E. 706.
2 Sec. 2235 Burns', Rev. of 1926, as amended by See. 2235 Burns' Supp. of 1929.
"Paul v. Virginia (1868), 8 Wall. 168; Waters-Pierce Oil Co. V. Texas (1889),
177 U. S. 28, 20 Sup. Ct. 518; State v. Sterrin (1916), 78 N. H. 220, 98 Ati. 482.
'Barron v. Burnside (1887), 121 U. S. 186, 7 Sup. Ct. 931; So. Pao. R. P.. v.
Denton (1892), 146 U. S. 202, 13 Sup. Ct. 44; Baltic Min. Co. v. Mass. (1913), 231
U. S. 68, 34 Sup. Ct. 15; Frost v. R. B. Comm. (1926), 271 U. S. 583, 46 Sup. CL
605.
OBarron v. Burnside (1887), 121 U. S. 186, 7 Sup. Ct. 931.
'Frost v. P.. B.. Comm. (1926), 271 U. S. 583, 46 Sup. Ct. 605.
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condition must be constitutional-has not been universally applied,7 and
has been severely criticized,S it must be admitted that it has considerable
merit. The legislature should not have the indirect power to deprive persons of their constitutional guaranties by coercion. However, the result
reached by the court upon this point was correct, even though its language
was too broad. The condition involved in this particular case would not
amount to the surrender of a constitutional privilege unless the privilege
to which it is attached is itself guaranteed by the Constitution.
But, was the court correct in holding that this privilege does not exist
in the absence of a statute? It cannot be denied that the great weight of
authority supports this position.9 But, it is submitted that if the United
States Supreme Court followed one of its recent decisions to its logical
conclusion, a different and more desirable result might be reached. In that
case,' 0 it was held that a system whereby an inferior judge is paid only
when there is a conviction, is unconstitutional as a violation of the due
process clause. This result could only have been reached upon the theory
that due process of law, as a matter of procedure, requires a fair and
impartial tribunal. It is true that there was a dictum in the case to the
effect that "all questions of judicial qualification may not involve constitutional validity. * * * Matters of personal bias would seem to generally be matters only of judicial discretion." But, if due process has been
extended to include the requirement that there be a fair and impartial
tribunal, this dictum would seem very hard to support. It could hardly
be argued that one has a fair and impartial tribunal 'when the judge is
biased and prejudiced. In the principal case the court pointed out that
the decisions of the judge on questions of law can be corrected upon appeal.
But, this hardly guarantees a fair trial, for as was pointed out in In re
Davis Estatell "there are presumptions in favor of his (the judge's) rulings which cannot be ignored, and he can make orders which cannot be disturbed unless there has been a gross abuse of discretion."1 2
If we assume that the United States Constitution does guarantee the
privilege of a change of venue from the judge for bias and prejudice, is
the condition imposed upon its exercise by the Indiana statute constitutional, as it is applied in this case? It is submitted that it is not. Of
course, the police power would allow the legislature to impose restrictions upon the exercise of such a privilege. But, restrictions would only
be within the scope of the police power if the social interests in their favor
were stronger than those in favor of the privilege protected. A social
interest in favor of expediting justice might be found behind the condition.
Opposed to this are the social interests in the individual life, and in a fair
administration of justice. Does the former social interest outweigh the
latter ones so that it would be constitutional to deprive a defendant of the
privilege because he had failed to comply with the statute, in a case where,
7See note 3 (Supra).
errill, Unconstitutional Conditions (1929), 77 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 879.
9 Longv . State (1920), 25 Ga- App. 22, 102 S. E. 359; Hennon v. State (1925), 33
Ga. App. 600, 127 S. E. 473; Tucker v. State (1926), 35 Wyo. 430, 251 Pa. 460;
Berry v. State (1918), 83 Tex. Cr. R. 210, 203 S. W. 901.
10
Tumey v. Ohio (1927), 273 U. S. 510, 47 Sup. Ct. 437.
"In
re Davis Estate (1891), 11 Mont. 1, 27 Pac. 342.
12
Approved in Day v. Day (1906), 12 Idaho 556, 86 Pac. 531.
8
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through no fault of his, compliance was impossible? The restriction would
surely be valid in a case where the defendant could have complied, for it
would naturally prevent abuses of the privilege and expedite justice without substantial injury to an innocent defendant. It might be argued that
to make the rule effective it would be necessary to apply it in all cases,
and that the social interest behind the condition would therefore be strong
enough to justify its application even where compliance would be impossible. However, while the question is undeniably close, it is submitted that
in such a case the social interests in favor of the privilege are stronger,
and that the condition so applied is unconstitutional, assuming that the
privilege to which it is attached is guaranteed by the Constitution.
It is submitted, then, that the language of the court was too broad
when it said that since this was a privilege which could not be entirely
withheld, it could be granted upon any condition; that the result reached
was correct unless there was error in holding that there is no non-statutory
privilege to a change from the judge for bias and prejudice; that this latter
position is supported by the great weight of authority, but that the other
result logically ought to be reached; and that if it were reached, the condition attached to its exercise by the Indiana statute, as applied in this case,
would be unconstitutional.
W.H.H.
CONDITIONAL SALES-RIGHTS OF PARTIEs ON DEFAULT.-On May 29,
1929, appellant and appellees entered a conditional sales contract for the
purchase by the appellant from the appellees of a refrigerator. According
to this contract the purchase price was to be paid in monthly installments of
$19.78 with six per cent interest on each installment after its maturity.
The title was to remain in the appellees until the purchase price had been
fully paid. The contract further provided that on default by the appellant in any installment the appellees might at their option take possession
of the refrigerator and any sums previously paid would be considered payment for the use of the property including its depreciation. On November 26, 1929, after appellant had defaulted in the payments, appellees exercised their option and repossessed the property. The husband of the appellant testified that in a talk with appellees on May 16, 1930, it was agreed
that appellees were to redeliver the refrigerator on payment of $78.66 by
the appellant; that this was paid on that day but appellees refused to redeliver until all payments in arrears had been made. Suit was brought by
appellant for money had and received by appellees for appellant's use and
benefit. From a judgment of the trial court for the appellees, this appeal
was taken. Held, affirmed.l
Appellant defaulted in the payments under the written conditional sales
contract entered into on May 29, 1929. There is some conflict in the
authorities as to the rights of the parties to a conditional sales contract
when the conditional buyer defaults and the seller repossesses the property. It is the rule in some jurisdictions that the buyer may recover any
amounts paid under the contract. 2 In other jurisdictions the amount paid
'Schwab v. Schmall, Appellate Court of Indiana (1932), 183 N. E. 328.
lnternationalHarvester Co. v. Lockwood (1932), (Ind. App.), 179 N. E. 736;
Hill v. Townsend (1881) 69 Ala. 286; Miller v. Steen (1S66), 30 Cal. 402, 89 Am.
2

